Month Two, Phase One of the Gaza War

On Friday morning, Israel resumed its bombing marketing campaign towards Gaza, and the civilian loss of life toll is as soon as once more rising. Each Hamas and Israel accused the opposite of violating the momentary truce. Israeli Protection Minister Yoav Gallant has promised, “We’ll struggle in the whole [Gaza] Strip.” Regardless of meekly worded solutions from Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Israel make an effort to cut back civilian deaths, the U.S. place stays one in all full-throttled assist for a navy marketing campaign that has killed greater than 15,000 Palestinians, the overwhelming majority of them kids and different civilians.

On this particular episode of Intercepted, political analyst Mouin Rabbani, co-editor of the Arab Research Institute’s ezine Jadaliyya, gives a provocative evaluation of the present scenario. In a dialogue with Jeremy Scahill and Murtaza Hussain, Rabbani means that behind the belligerent rhetoric and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s proclamations he’ll eradicate Hamas, Israel might already be heading for a bloody quagmire it’s unlikely to remodel into an accomplishment of its acknowledged targets. “We’re now properly into the second month of this battle, and essentially the most Israel has been capable of obtain is to boost the Israeli flag on a hospital. It’s not precisely Iwo Jima,” Rabbani says. The “Israeli navy is a really efficient killing machine when it’s dropping 2,000-pound bombs from the air, however a fairly mediocre combating power relating to floor operations.” Rabbani describes the evolution of Hamas’s technique and ways over the previous many years and maps out a number of eventualities which may emerge within the coming interval. “The thought which you can wipe [Hamas] out, even if you happen to totally reach conquering each final sq. inch of the Gaza Strip, is an phantasm,” he says. “It’s successfully unimaginable to renew this battle with out regional escalation.”

Jeremy Scahill: That is Intercepted.

Welcome to Intercepted. I’m Jeremy Scahill.

Murtaza Hussain: And I’m Murtaza Hussain. 

JS: Maz it looks as if the hardliners in Israel are getting their means. On Friday morning the momentary truce was shattered. Israel claims that Hamas fired rockets. Hamas is saying that Israel broke the truce. No matter the way it occurred, we at the moment are again to a scenario the place Israel has resumed heavy bombardment. Early indications are that they’re growing their marketing campaign within the south of Gaza. And Israel started its navy operations actually as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was taking off to depart Israel. 

Antony Blinken: Properly, good night everybody and thanks for bearing with us by way of an extended day. So that is my fourth journey to Israel because the Hamas terrorist assaults of October seventh.

JS: And it actually looks as if each time Blinken goes to the area or goes to Israel, it’s then adopted by an intensification of Israeli navy ways. And you already know Blinken has been making an attempt to publicly promote this speaking out of each side of the mouth from Washington. On the one hand giving full-throttled assist to Israel and alternatively saying, properly, we need to attempt to put some guardrails on Israel’s operations. And one of many issues that Blinken mentioned is: 

Antony Blinken: However Israel has essentially the most refined — some of the refined — militaries on this planet. It’s able to neutralizing the risk posed by Hamas whereas minimizing hurt to harmless males ladies and kids. 

JS: All we’ve seen from Israel since this began was the alternative. We’ve seen that Israel clearly desires to maximise the phobia being felt by civilians in Gaza. And a part of it appears aimed toward saying we’re gonna power them by way of cruel bombing to someway overthrow Hamas. However it exhibits a sort of elementary misunderstanding of the lens of historical past that many Palestinians are viewing this by way of and in addition the historical past of Hamas itself.

MH: Properly, if you happen to have a look at the satellite tv for pc footage and even statements from Israeli officers, it’s clear that their marketing campaign will not be aimed toward minimizing harm to the Palestinian folks or civilian infrastructure, or civilians themselves. They’ve been carrying it out in such a method to punish the inhabitants and also you’ve seen this within the loss of life toll as properly too.

So Blinken’s assertion that Israel has the aptitude of minimizing the toll to civilians could also be true per se however the implication is that they’re not taking that as a result of they’ve the know-how, they’ve the weaponry and so forth. However we’d not be seeing these large loss of life tolls of 15-plus thousand folks by some estimates — complete destruction of Gaza Metropolis — had been Israeli leaders taking, prioritizing and minimizing civilian hurt or simply specializing in Hamas per se. And we will see that they’re not simply specializing in Hamas, not simply by the toll on Gaza, but additionally by the actions of the West Financial institution lately, the place Hamas will not be in management and the place Israel remains to be ramping up its suppression of Palestinians killings and the therapy of Palestinians in jail too, which can also be deteriorated in latest weeks by many experiences.

So it’s very, very clear that Israel will not be behaving in the way in which that Blinken is portraying them as behaving or… This good cop unhealthy cop angle that the U.S. is taking in the direction of Israel is de facto not very convincing, even on these phrases. It’s clear that Israel is partaking in ways which we condemn very totally when completed by Russia or Syria or different international locations that we’re against. However once we’re seeing them in actual time by [a] U.S. ally, we’re getting at very minimal protection from the U.S. administration of Israeli actions. 

JS: You recognize, now we’re about two months into this acute facet of the battle. In fact, this battle has been occurring loads longer and began far, far sooner than October seventh, in fact. However we thought it will be good and value it to take a look at these two months which have shook the world, and to take action we’re joined by Mouin Rabbani. He’s a researcher, analyst, and commentator specializing in Palestinian affairs, the Arab-Israeli battle, in addition to the modern Center East. He’s the co-editor of Jadaliyya and contributing editor of Center East Report.

Mouin thanks a lot for being with us right here on Intercepted. 

Mouin Rabbani: It’s an actual pleasure to be with you. Thanks for inviting me.

JS: Let’s begin with the very starting of this acute facet of the battle. In fact, you’ll be able to say this has been occurring for a really, very very long time, however… October seventh. First, speak about what you perceive had been the strategic aims of Hamas in what they known as “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

MR: Properly, I feel we’re in all probability going to have to attend, and maybe wait a very long time, to get a definitive reply to that query. However the strategic goal, as I perceive it, was to shatter the established order, and to shatter it irrevocably.

It was a scenario during which the Gaza Strip had been beneath blockade for 16, 17 years, the occupation was properly into its sixth decade. In fact, there was additionally the dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948. And, along with that, what we had additionally seen was a variety of escalating Israeli measures.

To begin with, of specific curiosity to Hamas as an Islamist motion, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem, the rising settler pogroms, and dispossession and ethnic cleaning within the West Financial institution, notably within the Jordan Valley.

So, on the one hand, you might have these developments. Alternatively, you had a scenario the place Israel was more and more searching for to unilaterally resolve the core problems with the query of Palestine, with none reference to both Palestinian rights or Palestinian pursuits, and even negotiations with these Palestinians who had been most amenable to the Israeli agenda; right here, I’m referring to the Palestinian management, the management of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.

And the explanation it was capable of do it is because Israel had, on the one hand, the lively assist of the People. And, secondarily, the passive acquiescence of the Europeans, a passive acquiescence that has turned more and more into lively assist as properly. And I feel the explanation that Hamas determined it wanted to do one thing, for lack of a greater time period, genuinely spectacular on October seventh, is as a result of that they had tried to shatter the established order on two separate events, a minimum of.

The primary was the Nice March of Return in 2018, when very massive numbers of Palestinians went to the boundary between the Gaza Strip and Israel to show, on the anniversary of Nakba Day. And Israeli snipers shot and killed quite a few Palestinians, wounded many extra, medics had been killed, and so forth. And the world shrugged and, the next day, issues returned again to what they had been.

Extra lately, in 2021, represented the primary time that an Israeli-Palestinian armed confrontation occurred on the initiative of Hamas, fairly than Israel. And, simply as importantly, was initiated by Hamas for causes that had nothing to do with situations within the Gaza Strip. It was a response to rising Israeli incursions, and repression, and different measures in East Jerusalem; chances are you’ll keep in mind the tried settlement growth within the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem. After which particularly, additionally the Al-Aqsa Mosque. And even then, that lasted for a number of weeks, that was a so-called “Unity Intifada,” the place you had Palestinians rising up within the West Financial institution inside Israel, after which this confrontation between Palestinians and Israel within the Gaza Strip. A ceasefire was ultimately established and, as soon as once more, issues went again to their normal sample.

I feel, once you have a look at the size of what we noticed on October seventh, it may well’t be seen as a response to the insurance policies of the present far-right authorities in Israel: Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and Smotrich, and so forth. Positive, that was an element, however the planning for an operation of this dimension, scale, and scope will need to have began earlier than — even perhaps properly earlier than — this authorities took workplace.

And so, I do know there’s a tendency responsible something and every part on Netanyahu — it’s sort of a Netanyahu derangement syndrome, if you’ll — however the present authorities is extra of a change in scale and depth, fairly than a change in coverage. And the problems that I used to be discussing beforehand had been kind of insurance policies of earlier Israeli governments, fairly than the present one. As well as, in fact, you had the prisoner file, which is of central significance, not solely to Palestinians usually and to Hamas, notably, but additionally to Yahya Sinwar, the chief of Hamas within the Gaza Strip, and seen as an architect of the October seventh assaults, personally.

So, if you happen to take all of those points collectively, my sense is that if you happen to had been to summarize Hamas’ strategic goal in a single phrase, it will be to irrevocably shatter the established order. Did they’ve very clear concepts of what they needed past that? On the tactical degree, sure. It’s fairly clear that the explanation they took so many Israeli troopers captive and civilians hostage is as a result of they needed a complete prisoner alternate, together with individuals who they had been unable to get launched within the 2011 settlement, that led to the liberty for a few thousand Palestinian prisoners. They needed adjustments with regard to the blockade, and so forth.

However did they’ve a transparent — and what they think about achievable — political goal? I haven’t actually seen the proof for that. My sense is they didn’t assume that far forward.

One final level is that I feel we additionally must recall that, on October seventh, the Israeli navy and intelligence providers not solely failed however, on the first signal of contact, they collapsed like a home of playing cards. So, now we have to contemplate it fairly seemingly that the size of the October seventh assaults far exceeded Hamas’s preliminary planning for that occasion, and that they ended up mainly working in a geographical space that’s bigger than the Gaza Strip itself. I don’t know to what extent Hamas deliberate for that. I believe they didn’t assume they’d have the ability to, and I believe that many of those expanded operations had been determined, and applied, and carried out within the warmth of the second, just because the Israeli defensive measures evaporated into skinny air.

MH: Mouin, within the wake of October seventh, the Israeli authorities has mentioned that its purpose is to eradicate Hamas; in numerous phrases, it mentioned that. And it’s reiterated that purpose now, over a month into the operation. Regardless of that, Hamas, by all accounts, nonetheless appears to have appreciable command and management inside Gaza. The latest prisoner alternate suggests as properly that they’re nonetheless very properly entrenched, and Israel remains to be very, very removed from reaching these acknowledged navy aims.

Out of your sense, how life like is that this purpose of destroying Hamas, or eradicating Hamas, because the Israeli authorities has put it. Is it an really achievable goal for Israel? And, if that’s the case, what would it not take to perform that?

MR: I don’t assume it’s achievable in any respect, and I feel we should always view this primarily as a rhetorical aspiration, fairly than a critical coverage. It’s fairly doable that, on October seventh, Netanyahu Protection Minister Gallant, Chief of Employees, and their largest champions in Washington — Biden and Blinken — believed that this might be, to make use of a phrase that was launched in 2003, “a cakewalk,” and may very well be simply achieved.

However even earlier than this Israeli offensive began, let’s have a look at the information. Hamas and a variety of different armed teams are additionally current within the West Financial institution. Hamas is a reasonably modest militia, even if you happen to evaluate it to different paramilitary organizations in that a part of the world, and particularly if you happen to evaluate it to standard state armies, and overwhelmingly, if you happen to evaluate it to the nuclear energy that’s Israel, that’s armed to the tooth with essentially the most superior weaponry within the U.S. arsenal. So, Hamas is already, in navy phrases, a fairly modest outfit. That’s referring to Hamas within the Gaza Strip.

Then, once you speak about Hamas and different teams within the West Financial institution, they’re not simply modest. I imply, they’re very flippantly armed. Most of their weaponry consists of, at finest, computerized weapons and explosives. However, for the previous two years, Israel has been conducting common intensive raids, notably within the northern West Financial institution, to wipe these organizations out. It has had the total cooperation of the Palestinian Authority on this marketing campaign. And, if something, the assaults emanating out of the West Financial institution — and Northern West Financial institution particularly — have been escalating.

So, if you happen to can’t eradicate an exceptionally poorly-armed sequence of militias which can be, in lots of respects, not even a coherent navy power from the West Financial institution the place you might have complete management, and you’ve got the cooperation of the Palestinian authorities, how will you anticipate to attain that goal towards a a lot better armed, extra coherent, a lot bigger and properly developed Palestinian armed group in a territory that it has managed for nearly twenty years? That might be my first reply.

Secondly, Hamas isn’t just a militia or an armed group. It’s a deeply rooted motion that exists wherever Palestinian communities exist right this moment, very a lot, like was the case — and in lots of respects nonetheless is a case — with the PLO and its constituent factions. So the thought which you can wipe this group out, even if you happen to totally reach conquering each final sq. inch of the Gaza Strip, can also be an phantasm. You’ve gotten the civil service, you might have the social providers, you might have the political motion. It’s a complete community of companies, organizations, and establishments, and so forth.

And so, I feel essentially the most that Israel may hope to achieve can be to wipe out the present management and to severely degrade the navy capabilities of Hamas, however solely within the Gaza Strip. And even that has been a complete failure. We’re now properly into the second month of this battle, and essentially the most Israel has been capable of obtain is to boost the Israeli flag on a hospital. It’s not precisely Iwo Jima.

And never solely that, I feel there’s one other level price making, as your query implied: On the very outset of this battle, Israel and the USA vowed, as you mentioned, that they’d eradicate Hamas, that there can be no truce till this goal was achieved, and that there would completely be no negotiations with this group. Properly, if you happen to have a look at the scenario right this moment, there has now been roughly every week of a truce, a complete sequence of exchanges of captives, and these have been the results of Qatari- and Egyptian-mediated negotiations between the USA and Israel on the one hand, and Hamas on the opposite. And the one who was main the negotiations on behalf of Hamas is Yahya Sinwar, the very architect of the October seventh assault.

So, Israel and the USA have already climbed down fairly removed from the tree they jumped into. They’re negotiating, they’re accepting truces, they’re implementing agreements that overwhelmingly replicate the situations initially proposed by Hamas, fairly than by them. So, how will you eradicate a company you’re negotiating and reaching agreements with?

In fact, sooner or later, I do anticipate the Israeli offensive to renew, however I feel we’re now in a stage the place probably we’ll see one, possibly one or two, livid Israeli makes an attempt to inflict as a lot harm as they will. After which, I feel the clock will begin winding down fairly rapidly.

JS: Mouin, these scenes that now we have seen play out over the course of the exchanges of Israeli captives and Palestinian captives are surreal on a variety of ranges. On the one hand, Hamas is placing out pretty refined video manufacturing on its aspect of the handovers. Typically they’ve drone pictures that they’re utilizing to indicate the autos, we’ve additionally seen these scenes of a number of Israeli prisoners smiling at them, shaking their fingers, waving at them, talking to them.

And Hamas has what I feel is a reasonably refined data operation that they’re operating. In addition they, in one of many exchanges, determined to do it proper within the middle of Gaza Metropolis…

MR: Twice, really.

JS: Twice, proper? The primary time that it occurred, I might have paid critical cash to look at Netanyahu’s face as that was occurring.

However you even have Yahya Sinwar performing as a type of commander-in-chief in battle, and reportedly went down into tunnels the place a few of the Israelis had been being held, and had interactions with them. One of many launched Israelis, an 85-year-old girl who identifies herself as a peace activist, has been telling Israeli media that she had an alternate with Yahya Sinwar, the place she sort of shamed him for attacking them and mentioned, “we’re peace activists.”

However what I’m getting at is that you’ve got a way more refined public imaging operation occurring from Hamas, and I need to get your tackle what’s at play there, and the way that is being acquired within the broader Arabic language public on this planet.

MR: Sure. Properly, I might begin by saying that Hamas propaganda within the early days was very crude and really ineffective. And what seems to be the case is that they’ve taken a web page out of Hezbollah’s playbook. And right here, I’m referring to the expertise of Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant motion, within the Nineteen Nineties, when it was launching more and more profitable assaults on Israeli occupation forces, and on their native collaborators, the so-called South Lebanon Military.

And each time Hezbollah would declare, “we attacked this and that base or outposts, we will affirm that we inflicted X casualties,” the Israeli navy spokesman would come out and say, properly, the Arabs are mendacity once more. And that is propaganda, we’ve obtained every part beneath full management.

Then, with the technological developments that we noticed within the 90s, Hezbollah started recording their assaults on video, after which broadcasting them on its tv station, Al-Manar. And, fairly quickly, what you had will not be solely their very own constituency in Lebanon — and other people within the Center East, extra broadly — realizing that this is a company whose claims had a variety of credibility. However, additionally, that its enhance in credibility was as a result of it was telling the reality, it was being trustworthy. And it wasn’t inventing and exaggerating achievements that didn’t exist.

And, most significantly, it obtained to a degree the place the Israeli public started to belief Hezbollah propaganda greater than the propaganda of their very own navy and their very own authorities. And what I feel we’ve seen right here is broadly comparable.

I do know your query was particularly in regards to the launch of captives, however what we’ve seen is a complete sequence of statements by Hamas’s navy spokesperson, Abu Obaida, who’s now turn out to be maybe the only hottest determine within the Center East; that’s not Mahmoud Abbas, as Biden and Blinken would really like you to assume. And he not solely makes statements, however backs them up with video that substantiates these statements.

My sense is that Hamas propaganda is directed — or, a minimum of within the preliminary phases — was directed primarily at Palestinian and Arab public opinion, and in addition at Israeli public opinion. However then, once you started to get all these statements popping out of the Israeli management, out of the U.S., notably from European capitals additionally, saying Hamas is ISIS, Hamas is worse than ISIS, Hamas are Nazis … And it obtained to the purpose the place folks have really been downplaying the Nazi Holocaust so as to recommend that the true difficulty right here will not be Adolf Hitler, however Yahya Sinwar, and so forth.

Then Hamas additionally started, I feel, making an attempt to affect international, and notably Western public opinion, which is, I feel, a fairly new enviornment for them. And the way in which they’ve tried to do that is to place out movies making an attempt to show, whether or not you consider it or not, that they’re treating their captives humanely, that they don’t think about attacking civilians a strategic purpose, and so forth.

In fact that is propaganda and political theater, such issues all the time are, whether or not it’s by Hamas or anybody else. However I might however evaluate and distinction the picture Hamas is making an attempt to challenge in relation to its therapy and launch of captives that it holds with these of Israel.

I imply, have a look at the distinction. In these Hamas movies, they’re handing over their captives to the Worldwide Committee of the Purple Cross, pushing outdated girls in wheelchairs, handing water bottles to their launched captives, waving goodbye and giving them a pleasant send-off. Political theater, propaganda? In fact.

However what can we see at Ofer Jail in Beituniya, simply exterior Ramallah, the place Israel is releasing Palestinian captives? Properly, you might have, to begin with, clouds of tear gasoline being fired by the Israeli forces at gatherings of Palestinian well-wishers. You’ve gotten really stay ammunition being fired at these folks, and a number of other have been killed. Israeli police have been raiding the houses of captives who’re about to be launched, and actually warning their households that any expressions of pleasure are verboten. And intimidating journalists, evicting journalists from the houses of launched captives.  So, it’s not solely what Hamas has been doing, it’s additionally the distinction between Hamas and the Israelis.

And yet another distinction is that — and that is much less of a Hamas coverage, in fact, as a result of it doesn’t actually have a lot or any management over these conditions within the West Financial institution — however the Palestinians have been very keen for his or her launched prisoners to explain the situations of their captivity, which have been horrific. And to debate their expertise of reaching freedom, and so forth. Bear in mind, to this point, a minimum of, we’re speaking about kids — or what I feel The Guardian calls “people beneath 18,” as a result of Palestinians aren’t kids — and ladies, a lot of whom, had been by no means charged with a single offense, not to mention tried, even, by a navy courtroom for any offense.

So, you might have the Palestinians very keen to reveal their launched captives to the media and to inform their tales, after which you might have Israel which, beneath the pretext of medical checkups, is holding its personal launched captives incognito, as a result of they’re terrified that these folks will say, properly, really, no, we weren’t beheaded and burned alive, and no, it wasn’t fairly, the ISIS story that you simply’ve been making an attempt to convey to the world.

JS: On that particular difficulty, I feel we simply need to say clearly that the Israeli civilians who had been taken hostage, together with very younger kids, witnessed totally horrifying acts the place their dad and mom had been killed, or their neighbors had been killed. And also you then had the Israeli navy are available on October seventh, and there’s critical questions on what number of Israelis and overseas employees — Thai employees and others — that had been killed by the Israeli response to the assaults orchestrated by Hamas. However I’m saying that as a result of I feel it’s necessary to do not forget that, it doesn’t matter what, the individuals who then had been taken hostage by Hamas already went by way of unspeakable terror as human beings.

Now, having put that on the desk, I need to ask you one thing in regards to the two camps of tales we’re beginning to hear rising from Israelis who had been held hostage, and their relations. A number of Israelis have described being handled with respect whereas in Hamas captivity. They described tough situations, they talked about how they had been consuming the identical meals because the guards or the folks that had been holding them captive, and that typically the meals was dwindling, and typically it was OK. Similar scenario with treatment.

Alternatively, you’re beginning to have relations of kids who had been held hostage describing issues like, the kid was made to look at movies of the October seventh assaults. And in the event that they had been crying, that they had a gun pointed at them. And a few of the Thai employees saying that some Israelis had been being crushed with electrical cords; not with stay wire electrical energy, however with electrical cords. And these are the 2 types of narratives which have began to bleed out within the Israeli media. And, in fact, some are promoted greater than others.

However what I needed to ask you is considerably of a granular-level query, and that’s: do we all know that each one of those hostages had been being held by the identical entity? As a result of we did see, in a few of the exchanges, members of Hamas, and members who had been recognized as Islamic Jihad handing over sure prisoners. We additionally know that there are, I feel, credible experiences that a few of the folks taken hostage that day in Israel had been taken by what gave the impression to be type of freelance gangs, or folks that possibly weren’t essentially working beneath the umbrella of Hamas, or beneath the path of Mohammed Deif, the top of the Qasim brigades.

I do know you don’t have inside data, however what’s your sense of how totally different hostages had been held, and the way Hamas has needed to type of work out the place all of them are, and whether or not there could also be totally different layers of therapy primarily based on who was holding the Israelis within Gaza?

MR: It’s an excellent query, and let me begin by repeating your level, that no civilian deserves or must be positioned in captivity with out due course of by a authentic courtroom of legislation that convicts them for a particular crime. I feel the distinction between us and plenty of different folks is, on this context, we really feel that that may be a standards that applies not solely to Israelis, however to any human being, and even contains Palestinians.

Secondly, sure, for each Israeli and Palestinian civilians, notably kids, the preliminary seizure of those folks was in fact traumatic, can usually embody violence and brutality. And now I’m talking particularly in regards to the Israelis and Gaza; there’s a number of unanswered inquiries to me, as a result of I feel that the primary goal of Hamas on October seventh was to knock out The Gaza Division, which is a division of the Israeli navy chargeable for sustaining the Gaza focus camp, and launching periodic assaults on it.

I feel it’s kind of established that additionally they sought to assault and, a minimum of quickly, management a variety of inhabitants facilities within the so-called Gaza envelope. To what extent seizing Israeli civilian captives was a part of the preliminary plan, I don’t know, however it did occur. And we additionally know — and that is in response to each Palestinians, Israelis, the Qatari and Egyptian mediators, and the USA — that the captives are being held not solely by Hamas however, as you mentioned, a quantity are additionally held by Islamic Jihad. And there are others who’re being held by … I don’t know if it’s gangs or extraordinary civilians who … As a result of, you already know, as soon as Hamas breached the barrier on October seventh, lots of people began streaming into close by Israeli settlements, whether or not it was merely to expertise a style of freedom, or to have interaction in looting, or to have interaction in acts of revenge, or a mixture of the above, will not be clear. However a few of the individuals who had been seized and brought into the Gaza Strip had been by these teams.

And we’ve gotten a variety of propaganda. I feel this week we heard a narrative of testimony — I consider it was a seven-year-old youngster — saying that he was being held by an UNRWA instructor; UNRWA is the U.N. company for Palestinian refugees that has been beneath systematic U.S. and Israeli and European assault for many years. And we’re anticipated to consider that the seven-year-old youngster not solely is aware of what UNRWA is, but additionally that the very first thing his captor mentioned to him is, a very powerful factor you’ll want to learn about me is that I’m an UNRWA instructor, and, if you happen to don’t consider me, listed below are my pay stubs, as a result of I’m determined to get fired from my job. You recognize, it simply defies creativeness.

I additionally assume that the inconsistencies within the tales of therapy are slightly too contradictory for my liking. I might discover it plausible if the final sample was abuse, or the final sample was humane therapy, however the concept comparable folks beneath equivalent circumstances are handled very otherwise, I simply don’t discover it very convincing.

The one rationalization that I might have for this, whether it is certainly right, is that there might have been abuse, torture of navy prisoners so as to extract data from them by their captors.The opposite chance, as you mentioned, is that it could be that you simply had sure people seized by extraordinary residents, or different teams that determined to deal with their captives very otherwise.

However the concept you might have ten folks in the identical room, 5 had been handled humanely, and 5 had been consistently abused… There’s an excessive amount of contradiction in there for my liking, until there are different elements that assist clarify that.

A last level — and once more, nobody deserves to be held captive until they’re convicted of a particular crime by a authentic authority — having seen these pictures of those Israeli captives being launched, I’ve to say, and I feel it must be mentioned, they regarded in higher situation than lots of the Palestinian civilians who had been there to witness their launch and departure. I feel that’s an necessary level to make.

MH: Mouin, it appears very clear now that the Israeli navy and Israeli authorities launched into this battle in Gaza with no clear plan for a way they’d wish to proceed all through the course of the battle, and in addition, very importantly, after it’s over, whether or not they achieved their aims or not. And the U.S. authorities additionally has cosigned and inspired this battle, once more, with out actually having an concept of what they need to occur, finally.

I’m very curious, as a result of I’ve heard Blinken, and Biden, and others say that their preferrred scenario is that, on the finish of the battle, the Palestinian Authority might be in cost in Gaza. However it looks as if the Palestinian Authority has not been very related, and it’s decreased in recognition because the battle started.

Are you able to discuss a bit about how life like or unrealistic you see that end result being?

MR: That is primarily a U.S. challenge, as a result of Israel’s technique, in fact, has been to maintain the Palestinians divided and fragmented. And one motive that Hamas has been capable of stay in energy within the Gaza Strip all these years is as a result of Israel — its distaste for Hamas however — has most popular a scenario during which the West Financial institution — or these components of it beneath Palestinian administration — and the Gaza Strip are dominated by separate and rival entities, fairly than by a unified entity.

And Netanyahu, for instance, has spoken out very clearly towards any return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, and I feel he speaks for the consensus of the Israeli management, and never simply this management, on that difficulty. So, once more, it’s primarily a U.S. challenge.

And this has an extended historical past, the crux of which is mainly that it’s the U.S. and never the Palestinian individuals who will decide who represents them, who leads them, who guidelines them. It’s [that] the appropriate of Palestinian illustration belongs to Washington, and never the Palestinians.

The factor in regards to the Palestinian Authority is that it’s, actually, a disintegrating entity. Israel, notably because the eruption of the Second Intifada in 2000, has systematically applied measures to weaken the Palestinian Authority, to remodel it, basically, right into a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation, whose major operate is sort of as an adjunct to the Israeli navy and intelligence providers within the West Financial institution. This has been fairly systematic and, once more, it’s not one thing that has ever been substantively opposed by those that declare that the Palestinian Authority must be empowered in order that it may well take part in a political decision of this battle.

So, you might have the People sort of actively supporting this Israeli coverage, whereas saying that they need the PA to be strengthened, and you’ve got the Europeans successfully doing the identical. Each time there’s a brand new Israeli outrage, how does the European Union reply? Properly, it launches one more investigation of Palestinian elementary faculty textbooks. I imply, that’s sort of the extent of European opposition to Israeli coverage in the direction of the Palestinians, and its efforts to weaken the Palestinian authority.

So, you might have a Palestinian Authority that may’t even impose its authority over these areas of the West Financial institution that are formally beneath its administration. And, on this disaster, what you’ve had — as is commonly the case when Israel tries to eradicate the Palestinian group — Hamas’ stature has been skyrocketing whereas the PA is primarily current by way of its absence within the public consciousness. I imply, Mahmoud Abbas is sort of trotted out each different week to make a meaningless assertion. The man is totally AWOL.

One other factor is, Hamas is way from universally standard within the Gaza Strip. There’s really been fairly a little bit of opposition in the direction of its continued rule over the Gaza Strip over time, even perhaps growing lately. However, that however, one factor just about all Palestinians within the Gaza Strip agree upon is that they detest the Palestinian Authority.

So, opposition to Hamas doesn’t translate into assist for the Palestinian Authority, as a result of the Palestinian Authority has performed a really, very pernicious function in punishing the folks of the Gaza Strip, by taking part within the blockade, by doing nothing to … As a result of the Palestinian Authority — or, fairly, Mahmoud Abbas particularly — sees not solely Hamas as its enemy, as his enemy, however sees the whole Gaza Strip as an enemy, and has handled it as such over time.

You’ve gotten a former Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad — who additionally has a really low recognition rankings, however that’s a unique query — he’s one in all a number of who I consider are on the document as saying that they acquired directions from Mahmoud Abbas to additional flip the screws on the Gaza Strip, and refused to take action.

And so, the Palestinian Authority is seen by nearly all of Gazans as a part of the issue — notably Mahmoud Abbas — and never a part of the answer. Now, the People, however … Once more, we’re speaking in regards to the Washington echo chamber, so you’ll be able to say something supplied it has no relationship to actuality. They’re beneath this phantasm that they will resuscitate the Palestinian Authority, even perhaps appoint a brand new chief in Washington’s picture who might be lionized by the Palestinian folks. That they may then deliver him into the Gaza Strip on the again of an Israeli tank, and that he might be acquired with rice and flowers by each Palestinian within the Gaza Strip.

I imply, there’s just one downside right here, placing apart all these political points. If the PA can’t even administer territories beneath its jurisdiction within the West Financial institution, and if the U.S. can’t even problem Israel’s systematic efforts over time to weaken the Palestinian Authority, how are you going to get a strengthened PA that’s really going to rule the Gaza Strip?

And there’s one different level right here, which is that each one these eventualities have as a prerequisite the profitable eradication of Hamas within the Gaza Strip. If Hamas stays, not whilst a coherent motion, however retains residual navy capabilities, these eventualities are all pie-in-the-sky and off the desk.

JS: The ultimate space we needed to cowl was in regards to the Biden administration, and the way Joe Biden, and Antony Blinken, and Jake Sullivan, and this administration have dealt with the occasions of October seventh and past. And what we noticed firstly, and for anybody that is aware of something about Joe Biden’s profession, it was no thriller how he was going to reply. He was all in with full assist for scorched earth bombing and floor operations on the a part of the Israeli state. So, that shouldn’t have come as a shock to anybody. And that was sustained as simply the general public messaging, additionally, for the primary a number of weeks of this.

And you then had this sort of second of schizophrenia from the messaging from the White Home the place, on the one hand, that was nonetheless occurring, however you then had primarily Antony Blinken operating round beginning to say, oh, we have to take care of the humanitarian disaster now in Gaza. They usually begin planting tales with unnamed officers speaking about how Biden is so involved in regards to the destiny of the harmless civilians of Gaza.

And now, we’ve hit a degree the place that is now, it’s virtually just like the dominant messaging now from the White Home is, this has to cease sooner or later. After which they’re leaking tales about how they’re making an attempt to place a leash on Netanyahu, and type of draw a line about what’s going to occur in southern Gaza.

Make sense of this, out of your perspective. Like, give us an summary of how you might have seen the response from Biden and his brightest guys within the room.

MR: Properly, I hoped you wouldn’t ask me to do some Kremlinology right here, however I’ll give it my finest shot.

Look, I don’t take any of those statements severely. I feel your characterization of Biden is completely right, and it applies equally to Blinken who, definitely relating to the Center East, is considerably of a clueless airhead. He genuinely believed that the 2003 Anglo-American invasion, occupation, and destruction of Iraq would create a century of peace and safety and stability within the Center East. I feel one factor we have to perceive about Blinken is there’s by no means been a battle within the Center East that he hasn’t totally embraced. The man simply loves battle.

To offer one instance, the one distinction he’s had with Biden on Center East coverage was Libya, the place Biden had some misgivings. Blinken was all in, as a result of he was certain it will prove in addition to Iraq. Blinken is somebody who was against U.S. coverage in Syria through the Obama administration, as a result of it didn’t lead to battle. So, you already know, this man, he simply loves battle. I feel possibly he performed too many video video games as a child or one thing? I actually don’t know.

However I feel the true difficulty right here will not be the rising strain of public opinion within the U.S., which tends to come back in the beginning from what the Democratic Celebration would think about its pure constituency. I feel Biden genuinely doesn’t give a rattling about this. He’s obtained extra necessary issues, like supporting Israel. Blinken, for his half, I don’t assume has a clue. The purpose I’ve been making is Biden doesn’t care, Blinken doesn’t know.

Then you might have a 3rd faction, which I feel is represented by CIA director Invoice Burns, who is aware of the Center East very properly, and understands its politics. And I might argue, additionally, in all probability Protection Secretary Lloyd Austin, and far of the highest brass within the Pentagon.

And if I may simply rewind a bit right here, I used to be earlier referring to the battle of 2021. And what you had then was not solely this rebellion by Palestinians all through Obligatory Palestine — in different phrases, within the West Financial institution inside Israel and the Gaza Strip — however it additionally started to unfold within the area. Palestinians in Jordan, and Syria, and Lebanon had been demonstrating, and you then began getting bigger and bigger demonstrations by rising lots of individuals within the Arab international locations. And, at a sure level, the Chief of Employees on the time, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Employees Mark Milley was giving congressional testimony, and he mentioned — I’m paraphrasing right here — that if this goes on for for much longer, it’s going to start having a critical influence on our pursuits within the area. And, subsequent factor you knew, the battle was over, and a ceasefire was achieved.

So, what I feel is occurring right here will not be a response to the rising outrage of public opinion, or perhaps a response to a slight change of tone amongst some U.S. allies in Europe, notably, or perhaps a realization that the Western-constructed rules-based worldwide order is successfully previous tense. What I feel you might have — and right here is my Kremlinology — what I feel you’re seeing is that you’ve got an ascendant faction inside the U.S. management, represented, I consider, by Burns and Austin, who’re taking a look at this not when it comes to civilian casualties or its political penalties for Biden’s reelection marketing campaign, however taking a look at it from the perspective of U.S. pursuits within the Center East.

And what they’re seeing is that it’s successfully unimaginable to renew this battle with out regional escalation, and their precedence is to forestall this regional escalation, as a result of additional regional escalation will increase the prospect that the U.S. will get immediately concerned. Significantly at a time when you might have sure Israeli leaders who, in view of the U.S. dedication to get immediately concerned if Hezbollah in Lebanon launches an all-out offensive towards Israel, view this as a golden alternative to enmesh the U.S. in a direct battle with Iran. In different phrases: for Israel to struggle its enemies to the final American.

And that is what I feel is uppermost within the minds of those that need to discover an off ramp. And it’s no coincidence, for my part, that the true diplomacy right here is being carried out not by Blinken, however by Burns, who’s been in Doha for the previous a number of days, together with a director of the Israeli overseas intelligence company, Mossad, in Qatar, in fact. Oh, and the top of Egyptian intelligence. So, I feel that’s the place the true discussions are happening. And Blinken is being allowed to play diplomat, right here and there.

Yeah. So, my sense is, I feel you very properly characterised the preliminary U.S. response. Then it grew to become clear that this omniscient, all-powerful, unbeatable Israeli navy is a really efficient killing machine when it’s dropping 2,000-pound bombs from the air, however a fairly mediocre combating power relating to floor operations. That it may well solely make additional progress in a context the place additional regional escalation is a certainty, and I feel that those that are most frightened in regards to the state of affairs seem to now have the higher hand.

And it’s due to that, that, rapidly, you’re listening to, 15,000 corpses later concern about civilian casualties.

MH: With the caveat that we nonetheless don’t know what dimensions this battle finally might take, there could also be a regional implication to it as properly, as you mentioned. However I’m curious, when it comes to the subsequent day after this battle’s over, how do you see the political horizon of the Israel-Palestine battle modified by October seventh, and every part that’s occurred since then?

Clearly, the extent of loss of life and destruction in such a small time-frame is unprecedented, even on this lengthy battle, and it’s going to have lasting impacts on each Palestinian, Israeli, regional, and, additionally, Western opinion for a lot of, a few years to come back.

I’m curious, how do you see politics after this battle? And what might we really anticipate, if something, when it comes to seeing a political decision any time within the foreseeable future?

MR: Properly, I’ll begin by getting again to your first query, which is that, on October sixth, the Palestinians had been utterly marginalized, and Israel and its sponsors within the U.S. and Europe had come to the conclusion that the Palestinians may very well be safely ignored. And that Israel [can] mainly have its means with the Palestinians, and resolve the entire difficulty unilaterally as a result of, on the one hand, nobody cared anymore, and, on the opposite, the Palestinians had been too powerless to do something about it. That modified on October seventh.

An optimistic state of affairs can be to recall an incident from the Seventies. In 1971, Israel’s then-defense minister, Moshe Dayan, who was the hero of Israel’s decisive navy victory in 1967, was giving a speech and, nonetheless stuffed with hubris, he mentioned, you already know, if I’ve to decide on, between Sharm El-Sheikh with out peace, or peace with out Sharm El-Sheikh, and he was referring to a resort in what was then the Israeli occupied Sinai Peninsula. If I’ve to make this selection, he mentioned, I select Sharm El-Sheikh with out peace.

Two years later, Egypt and Syria launched their joint offensive towards Israel to get better their occupied territories, and it precipitated such a shock inside Israeli elites that, by the tip of that decade, the Israeli authorities, then led by the way more radical Likud Celebration, negotiated a peace settlement with Egypt, a part of which gave not solely Sharm El-Sheikh, however each final grain of sand within the Sinai Peninsula again to Egypt. And who was a major negotiator of that settlement? Moshe Dayan.

And once more, I don’t need to get into the small print, however an necessary motive that Israel concluded its peace treaty was to get a freer hand with the Palestinians, and the colonization of the West Financial institution and Gaza Strip, and to take away the primary Arab navy power from the battle, and so forth, however that’s not the purpose I’m making right here.

Then you might have Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which is named Operation Peace for Galilee, however its actual identify was Operation Huge Pines. And there, Israel had a really well-developed technique: you invade Lebanon, you eradicate the PLO, you put in Bachir Gemayel, the chief of the fascist Phalangist Celebration as head of state in Lebanon.

He concludes a peace treaty with Israel, he expels all of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to Jordan. There’s a revolution in Jordan, and it’s remodeled from a Hashemite monarchy right into a Palestinian republic. That turns into the Palestinian homeland, and Israel can then proceed with the annexation of the West Financial institution and Gaza Strip. And, ultimately, not solely the West, however the worldwide neighborhood will acknowledge this.

Properly, to begin with, Israel ultimately proved incapable of seizing West Beirut by navy power. It was solely in a position to take action after the U.S. despatched a mediator to Beirut to barter the orderly withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut. After which, it solely took one bomb — an Operation Valkyrie-type operation — to knock off Bachir Gemayel, and the entire plan collapsed.

And you then had, a number of years later, the favored rebellion, the Intifada, from 1987 to 1993, and the PLO that was speculated to be eradicated in Beirut ended up main the Palestinians from the occupied territories. And once more, that is with out moving into any evaluation of the Oslo Agreements, however I feel the broader level is evident.

However in 1973 there was additionally one other dynamic, which is that Israel — or these Israelis who had been most dedicated to the everlasting retention of the occupied territories — started to see the specter of a possible Arab-Israeli peace, and also you had teams like Gush Emunim and others that started to very strongly intensify — with full authorities assist I ought to add — settlement exercise within the West Financial institution and Gaza Strip. So, you might have these totally different dynamics at work.

How will this play out? It’s very tough to say. On the one hand, I feel, once you hear Biden, and E.U. International Affairs Commissioner [Joseph] Borrell, and others, speaking a few reinvigorated initiative to attain a two-state settlement, you’ll be able to take all that with a grain of salt. Not as a result of a two-state settlement is now not on the desk, however as a result of you’ll be able to’t have a two-state settlement with out an finish to the occupation. And, since 1967 — so, now, for over half a century — there may be actually not a single occasion during which both the USA or Europe have confronted Israel with a single consequence for any of its actions within the occupied territories.

So, this complete technique of creeping and now leaping annexation has proceeded with out problem, and has been enabled by, for instance, the U.S. and Europe making these settlements economically viable, by permitting them to export their unlawful merchandise from their unlawful settlements into the European and American markets.

Sure, there have been verbal condemnations and statements, and so forth, however when it comes to sensible penalties? Actually zero. And a world during which Washington or Brussels problem Israel and take measures to compel Israel to finish its occupation, that doesn’t exist, any greater than the moon is made out of cheese.

So, my view, and I’m maybe in a minority right here, is that, a minimum of as a theoretical matter, a two-state settlement is completely achievable, as a result of I don’t consider there may be such a factor as a degree of no return.

When you evaluate the West Financial institution to Algeria, Algeria was internationally acknowledged as an integral a part of the French homeland till 1954 by the whole worldwide neighborhood because it existed then. That’s by no means been the case for Israel and the West Financial institution. And all it will take is a cellphone name from Washington and the occupation would finish. Once more, that’s by no means going to occur, however you’ll be able to consider methods during which Western pursuits within the Center East are sufficiently challenged, that the U.S. and Europe might start to vary their insurance policies.

So, the difficulty will not be whether or not there could be a two-state settlement. I feel one query we have to ask ourselves in view of what we’ve seen previously month is whether or not there must be peace with Israel. And right here’s what I imply by that.

When you have a look at Europe within the Nineteen Forties, at a sure level, a conclusion was reached that there may very well be no peace in Europe with out the dismantling of the Nazi regime, as a result of it was a rabid, lunatic, irrational state with whom peace was merely unimaginable. Nobody talked about exterminating or expelling the German folks, however about dismantling the state and its key establishments.

You go to Southeast Asia within the late Seventies, and a conclusion was reached that, along with the expulsion of American forces, peace in Southeast Asia couldn’t be attained with out dismantling the rabid, lunatic, totally irrational Khmer Rouge regime. You go to Southern Africa within the Nineteen Nineties and, equally, it grew to become obvious that, until you dismantle the white minority regime in South Africa, peace in Southern Africa would stay a pipe dream.

Now, you have a look at Israel right this moment. It’s a state that has reached such a level of irrational, rabid lunacy that its authorities routinely accuses its closest allies of supporting terrorism. And, within the final week or two alone, Israel has accused the leaders of Spain, Belgium, and Eire of supporting terrorism for having even the slightest disagreement with it.

You’ve gotten Israel’s clownish consultant to the United Nations, who attends safety council conferences sporting a focus camp outfit, or a minimum of the yellow star, and demanding the quick resignation of the U.N. Secretary Normal, whose place … He hasn’t named Israel as soon as as chargeable for something. However he demanded his quick resignation just because he made the plain factual remark that the assaults of October seventh weren’t the start of the historical past of this battle, and is demanding resignations left and proper.

For Israel, slaughtering 15,000 folks in a month, conducting essentially the most intensive bombing within the historical past of the Center East — and we’re speaking in regards to the Center East, not Scandinavia — has turn out to be completely regular. It’s a state that has turn out to be totally incapable of any type of inhibition. I might argue that the Israeli regime is a transparent and current hazard to peace within the Center East, and, fairly than drawing any conclusions, fairly than or along with having a dialogue and debate about how Israeli-Palestinian peace is perhaps achieved, we must also be asking ourselves, ought to that peace be achieved? Or, fairly, can it solely be achieved by dismantling a regime and its key establishments the way in which that was completed in Europe within the Nineteen Forties, in Southeast Asia within the Seventies, in South Africa within the Nineteen Nineties, Southern Africa within the Nineteen Nineties, and I’m certain there are different examples as properly.

And, simply to be clear, I’m not speaking about expulsion of Israeli residents or whatnot. I’m speaking a few regime and its establishments. Once more, let’s not bounce to conclusions, however let’s ask the tough questions.

JS: On that observe, Mouin Rabbani, we need to thanks very a lot for being with us. And I do know it’s not standard to offer out folks’s Twitter — or they name it “X” — handles proper now, however I actually suggest to folks to offer you a observe on no matter we’re calling Twitter today. It’s @MouinRabbani. We’ll additionally hyperlink to it.

However, Mouin, thanks very a lot for sharing your evaluation with us.

MR: Thanks. And, simply in your final level: I don’t block trolls, as a result of they all the time assist me substantiate my argument.

JS: All proper. Thanks a lot, Mouin. We actually respect it.

MR: Thanks very a lot. It was a pleasure being with you.

MH: That was Mouin Rabbani, the co-editor of Jadaliyya. He additionally has his personal podcast known as, Connections. We’ll hyperlink to that on our web site. 

JS: And that does it for this episode of Intercepted. We gained’t have an upcoming episode this upcoming Wednesday however we’ll be again the next week as normal. 

Intercepted is a manufacturing of The Intercept. José Olivares is the lead producer. Our supervising producer is Laura Flynn. Roger Hodge is Editor-in-Chief of The Intercept. Rick Kwan combined our present. Authorized overview by David Bralow and Elizabeth Sanchez. This episode was transcribed by Leonardo Faierman. Our theme music, as all the time, was composed by DJ Spooky.

MH: If you wish to assist our work, you’ll be able to go to theintercept.com/be a part of. Your donation, it doesn’t matter what the scale, makes an actual distinction. And, if you happen to haven’t already, please subscribe to Intercepted, and positively do depart us a score and overview everytime you discover our podcasts. It helps different listeners to seek out us as properly.

JS: If you wish to give us extra suggestions, e mail us at podcasts@theintercept.com

Thanks a lot for becoming a member of us. Till subsequent time, I’m Jeremy Scahill. MH: And I’m Murtaza Hussain.